IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. - Optimal Incentive Wage Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2010 International Conference on Internet Technology and Applications (iTAP)

Author(s): Jianzhang Li
Publisher: IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
Publication Date: 1 August 2010
Conference Location: Wuhan, China, China
Conference Date: 20 August 2010
Page(s): 1 - 4
ISBN (CD): 978-1-4244-5143-2
ISBN (Paper): 978-1-4244-5142-5
DOI: 10.1109/ITAPP.2010.5566526
Regular:

In this paper, we study the problem in which a risk-neutral principal design optimal incentive wage contracts for a risk-averse agent under asymmetric information.Using the theories and methods of... View More

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