IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. - Incentive compatible mechanism design for synthetic task allocation in virtual organizations

2005 International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems

Author(s): Linli He ; T.R. Ioerger
Sponsor(s): IEEE Boston Sect
Publisher: IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
Publication Date: 1 January 2005
Conference Location: Waltham, MA, USA
Conference Date: 18 April 2005
Page Count: 6
Page(s): 205 - 210
ISBN (Paper): 0-7803-9013-X
DOI: 10.1109/KIMAS.2005.1427081
Regular:

In most computational organizational models, the designers of traditional task allocation mechanisms generally make an implicit assumption that organizational agents will report their true... View More

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